Leadership styles in United States Marine Corps transport helicopter squadrons. by Salter, David Jerome
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
1989
Leadership styles in United States Marine Corps
transport helicopter squadrons.
Salter, David Jerome



























.ASSIFIO N OF Tl
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE
a RE- 3RT SECURITY C . A S S F i C
-
UNCLASSIIFIED






lb RES T °IC*iVE MARKINGS
3 DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF
Approved for public releases-
distribution is unlimited
4 PER rr RM ' ORGAN'ZATiON REPORT NUMBER(S) 5 MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)





7a NAME OF MONITORING ORGANiZATiON
Naval Postgraduate School
6c ADDRES (City State and ZIPCode)
Monterey, CA 93943-5000
7b ADDRESS (C/ty, State, and ZIP Code)
Monterey, CA 93943-5000
cb OFFICE ' '
(// apphca





E - E M
..OF- UNiT
ACCESSION NO
Leadership Styles in United States Marine Corps Transport Helicoptejr
'--S-quadrons
SALTER, DAVID JEROME
The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official
.„pDli_c.y„ox.-4iDsitio,n»J3f^.the Department of Defense of the U.S. Gover-nmeftt——
-
Master's Thesis TC DECEMBER 1989 83
transformational leadership, cohesion, morale,
military history, differences in perception
-
This thesis examined leadership styles in United States Marine Corpfs
transport helicopter squadrons. Analyses were conducted to determine how
leadership styles related to subordinate extra effort, leader effectiveness,
satisfaction with leader, unit cohesion, and unit morale. The importance of
military history to the development of military leaders was also examinee
.
Leadership styles of officers were evaluated by the leader himself as well as
his subordinates, superiors, and peers. Proactive transactional leadership
styles were found to be the most commonly used styles, while reactive and
non-leadership were found to be the least used styles. Transformational
styles had a strong relationship to subordinate extra effort, leader
effectiveness, and unit cohesion and morale. Differences in how a leader
perceived himself as compared to how others perceived his style were also












Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited




Major, United States Marine Corps
B.S., Auburn University, 1977
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of





This thesis examined leadership styles in United States
Marine Corps transport helicopter squadrons. Analyses were
conducted to determine how leadership styles related to
subordinate extra effort, leader effectiveness, satisfaction
with leader, unit cohesion, and unit morale. The importance of
military history to the development of military leaders was
also examined. Leadership styles of officers were evaluated by
the leader himself as well as his subordinates, superiors, and
peers. Proactive transactional leadership styles were found to
be the most commonly used styles, while reactive and non-
leadership were found to be the least used styles.
Transformational styles had a strong relationship to
subordinate extra effort, leader effectiveness, and unit
cohesion and morale. Differences in how a leader perceived
himself as compared to how others perceived his style were
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Reliance on hardware and technology as the focus of our
national security may have to change. With the current climate
of budget reductions and possible force cuts, the emphasis may
shift to less costly force multipliers such as leadership.
The role of leadership, while less tangible than weapons
systems, has historically been demonstrated to be critical to
combat effectiveness.
A considerable number of leadership research projects have
been funded by the military. In fact, the topic of leadership
has been the subject of extensive research for many years.
Early efforts attempted to identify traits or personal
characteristics of leaders reflecting the view thct leaders
are born, not made. This approach proved to be non-productive
because no one combination of traits consistently
distinguished effective from ineffective leaders [Ref. l:pp.
98-99]. The research focus shifted to behavioral approaches
that examined leadership functions and styles, for example,
the Ohio State studies [Ref. 2:pp. 94-100]. Contingency
approaches also emerged that emphasized the situational nature
of leadership, for example, Fiedler's contingency theory [Ref.
2:pp. 101-102]. The appeal of the newer ideas to the military
and others is that if such characteristics can be determined,
they can perhaps be trained.
These approaches to leadership have recently been
supplemented by theories of transformational leadership. The
proponents of these ideas view much of the previous work in
leadership as "transactional theories" in whicli leaders
communicate requirements to subordinates in exchange for which
subordinates receive rewards or punishment. In contrast,
transformational leaders motivate (transforir) their
subordinates to do more than expected. [Ref. 3:pp. 11-17]
Several studies have found that subordinates perceive that
transformational leaders contribute more to the effectiveness
of the organization than the transactional leaders.
Additionally, these leaders were rated as higher in J eadership
potential by their superiors [Ref. 4:pp. 18-19]. These results
have been found in military and civilian organizations, but
such research has not been conducted in the Marine Corps.
This thesis is an attempt to contribute to the leadership
data base through an investigation of United States Marine
Corps (USMC) leadership styles. A survey was conducted to
classify a leader's style as transactional, transformational,
or laissez-faire. The survey was administered to a group of
USMC officers who were commanding officers or officers in
charge at the squadron level ranging to the maintenance
division level. These focal officers were also evaluated by
their superiors, peers, and subordinates.
The focal leader's style was compared to various outcome
measures. The purpose was to determine which leadership style
was most related to positive outcomes.
II. BACKGROUND/LITERATURE REVIEW
A . BACKGROUND
Leadership, cohesion, and morale are the key human
intangibles of war [Ref. 5:p. 143]. Despite the American
inclination toward the material and concrete, the lessons of
history consistently show that these three factors are far
more important than superior numbers or weapons, and when
combined with better tactics can prove to be overwhelming
[Ref. 5:pp. 153-156].
The difficulty of quantifying troop leadership and morale
results in an emphasis on weapon performance and numbers.
However, Dunnigan notes that history is full of armies that
have been defeated while holding the technological edge.
"Superior motivation, leadership and training have
consistently proved the formula that produces victorious
armies." [Ref. 6:pp. 294-206]
Dunnigan maintains that victory usually results when "one
side's leaders are demonstrably better than the others'
leaders" and that "superior leadership need not be of earth
shaking dimensions in order to be effective." [Ref. 6:p. 307]
The military, above all others, should be interested in
leadership and what style is the most effective. Erwin Rommel
believed,
the tactical leaders of the future . . . will need not only-
mental gifts of a high order, but also great strength of
character if he is to be a match for his task. Because of
the great variety of tactical possibilities which
motorisation offers, it will in [the] future be
impossible to make
#
more than a rough forecast of the
course of battle. This being so, the issue will be
decided by the flexibility of mind, eager acceptance of
responsibility, a fitting mixture of caution and
audacity, and the greater control over the fighting
troops. [Ref. 7:p. 517]
Rommel goes on to say that the leader "must be tactically
and technically competent;" he must have "initiative and
energy: lead by personal example;" and "try to establish
personal contact with his men, but without weakening his
authority." [Ref. 7:pp. 516-518]
Several recent studies have investigated military
leadership and unit effectiveness. For example, Marashian
conducted a study of 50 United States Army infantry officers
who had served as leaders of small units in combat in Vietnam.
He found that leadership and the soldier's faith in that
leadership directly affected the soldier's motivation to
fight. [Ref. 8:pp. 57-63]
Gullickson, Chenette, and Harris studied excellence in the
surface Navy. Results of the research showed that the
excellent surface ship had a captain who knew what an
excellent ship looked like and how to share that vision.
Additionally, most of these captains did not micro-manage
their ships but gave a general "big picture" view on running
their ships. Technical expertise was not as important as the
ability to provide a direction to follow or the ability to get
their officers and men to commit to that direction. Teamwork
was very important, as was concern for the growth and
development of the individual. Responsibility and
accountability were pushed down the chain of commend. [Ref.
9:pp. 113-117]
Forde also found that leadership was the most important
factor in his study of excellence in United States Air Force
tactical fighter squadrons. Commanders of these squadrons had
a long-range goal or vision. Technical credibility was
critical, unlike Gullickson's study above. Forde identified
the squadron commanders' leadership style as people; oriented
and the leader as one who leads by example, cares about his
people, recognizes and rewards excellent performance, and
allows others to execute plans, make mistakes and J. earn from
them. These leaders delegate authority to the lowest levels
thereby developing and nurturing leadership "in house." [Ref.
10:pp. 47-80]
The world outside the military is also very interested in
leadership. The effects of leadership on human behavior and
organizational effectiveness have been researched and studied
by many theorists, philosophers, and practitioners. Yet
agreement on what style, if any, is most effective has proven
illusive. In fact, experts cannot even agree on a definition
of leadership.
Estoni defined leadership as the ability to elicit the
follower's response in a broad range of matters, based on the
personal qualities of the leader [Ref. 8:p. 2!3]. Terry
describes leadership as the activity of influencing people to
strive willingly for group objectives, while Koontz and
O'Donnel believe leadership is influencing people to follow in
the achievement of a common goal [Ref. 2:p. 85].
Much effort has gone into trying to find the "true" nature
of leadership. Trait theory was derived from the prescientif ic
notion of the "great man" [Ref. 11 :p. 4]. The "great man"
theory originated with the ancient Greeks and was perhaps the
first attempt to explain why some people were leaders and why
others were followers. The basic premise was that leaders were
born, not made. [Ref. 12:p. 10]
Prior to World War II, leadership research focused on the
search for leadership traits. The theory was that leaders had
identifiable traits or characteristics that could be used to
predict who would be a good leader. Trait theory sought to
identify the "inborn" traits that made leaders. Chemers and
Rice noted two reviews that concluded that although "certain
traits, such as intelligence showed consistent relationship
with leadership status, such relationships were far too weak
... to be of any psychological significance [Ref. l:pp. 92-
94] . "
Yukl notes that many of the leadership researcher:;, perhaps
prematurely, discarded any consideration of traits as
explaining who or what makes a leader [Ref. 13:pp. 69-70].
Most of the recent research in this area was conducted by
industrial psychologists who were interested in developing
selection criteria for managers. Instead of concent.rating on
who will be a leader, they concentrated on predicting who will
be the most effective leader.
In this context, Stogdill maintains that successful leaders
are often characterized by:
... a strong drive for responsibility and task
completion, vigor and persistence in pursuit of goals,
venturesomeness and originality in problem solving, drive
to exercise initiative in social situations, self-
confidence and sense of personal identity, willingness to
accept consequences of decision and action, readiness to
absorb interpersonal stress, willingness to tolerate
frustration and delay, ability to influence another
person's behavior, and capacity to structure social
interaction systems to the purpose at hand. [Ref. 13 :p
69]
After World War II, the research shifted to the leader's
behavior, and divided this behavior into consideration
(employee centered) and initiating structure (job centered).
However, research was unable to identify which behavior was
the most effective [Ref. l:pp. 92-94]. Fiedler and others
presented various contingency theories of leadership based on
the premise that "there is no such thing as a universally good
leader or one best way to lead . . . and there is a range of
leadership styles, approaches and different styles that are
minimally effective in different situations." [Ref. l:pp. 98-
99] However, some have been critical of situational leadership
for being too complicated for practical use [Ref.lo :p. 167].
Motivation has been seen as a fundamental aspect of
defining leadership. For example, James found that employees
who worked for hourly wages could maintain their jobs by
working at about 20-30% of their ability. His study also
showed that highly motivated employees work at close to 80-90%
of their ability. He concluded that low motivation in workers
is the same as having low-ability workers. [Ref. 2:p. 5]
If the leader is the one who tries to motivate people to
accomplish some task or to strive for an organizational goal,
then the measure of success would be whether the task was
accomplished or the goal was reached. However, Bass; contends
that there is more to leadership than success or failure.
There is also more to success than just the completion of the
task. A manager may be successful simply because he holds
positional power over his subordinates, that is, he holds the
key to reward or punishment. But if the subordinate: responds
because he wants to, the leader has personal power also. In
this sense the leader can go beyond being successful to being
effective. The effective leader has affected the at.titude of
the individual or group and tends to have a sustained impact
on productivity, while he may otherwise have only a s.hort-term
influence. [Ref. 2:p. 115] Hersey and Blanchard claim that
this may explain why some supervisors can get sat.isfactory
output only when exercising tight control of their
subordinates; the more effective leader depends on personal




The notion that leadership goes beyond goal accomplishment
represents a perspective that may be more productive for
military leaders than the ideas traditionally descrioed in the
research literature. This view is described in more detail in
subsequent paragraphs.
Burns theorized that leadership was inseparable from the
followers' needs and goals, and described the interaction
between leader and follower as taking "two fundamentally
different forms [Ref. 14:p. 19]." The first form Burns called
transactional leadership in which both the leader and follower
recognize each other's power and worth. These two pa::ties then
agree to exchange one thing for another; the leader exchanges
a reward for the followers' actions. The other fcrm, which
Burns called transforming leadership, was characterized by a
leader who, through addressing the followers' wants, needs,
and other motivations, binds with the follower in pursuit of
a higher purpose. [Ref. 15:p. 19]
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Like Burns, Bass is interested in transformational
leadership and has proposed and tested a theory that seems
highly appropriate to the military environment. Bass describes
his ideas in combination with transactional theories which, as
noted earlier, characterize many theories of management and
leadership. Transactional models are based on contingent
reinforcement that may be either positive or negative.
Positive reinforcement encourages the subordinate to
maintain his current performance levels, while negative
reinforcement encourages the subordinate to change his current
performance level. Typically, positive reinforcement comes in
the form of praise or promotion. Negative reinforcement may be
simply pointing out a deficiency and then following up with
further instructions or guidance. Or, it could take more
severe forms that affect pay and promotion opportunities.
Management-by-exception is the style chosen by leaders who
only take corrective action when there is a deficiency of some
sort
.
These styles, positive or negative reinforcement and
management-by-exception, typify the transactional leader.
These leaders are more interested in outcomes and efficiency
than development of subordinates. The mission is goal
accomplishment and the method is the carrot or the stick.
[Ref. 3: pp. 11-13]
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Bass discusses several studies, such as Hung and Schuler,
Oldham, and Keller and Szilagyi, that show where positive
contingent reinforcement produced not only acceptable
performance but also improved performance and effectiveness.
He also notes that Luthan and Krietner found that negative
reinforcement when combined with positive reinforcemient also
improved performance. [Ref. 3:p. 124]
If the rewards are not contingent, i.e., not linked to
performance, their impact on performance is minimal.
Subordinate satisfaction or feeling of accomplishment is
trivialized when such rewards are handed out indiscriminately.
The effect of negative reinforcement that is not linked to
substandard performance can also be very problematic with
respect to performance. [Ref. 3:pp. 121-134]
The main component in transactional leadership is the
ability of the leader to reward acceptable performance. If the
authority to reward is not held by the leader, the leader
losses power and subordinates will tend to look beyond that
leader to the one holding the real power. For a transactional
leader to be effective, he must have the ability to reward
(and punish) his subordinates. Once the transactional leader
has the authority to reward effective performance, he must
clarify what is expected of the subordinate and what goals and
performance will result in rewards. The leader should also
make every effort to remove obstacles that might interfere
12
with subordinates reaching their agreed-upon goal. [Ref.3:pp.
127-133]
The type of reinforcement that is most appropriate depends
on the needs of the subordinates. Young, inexperienced workers
might need constant and continuous praise and instruction
while older, experienced workers might need little
reinforcement. Transactional style is most effective when what
the subordinate does is clearly measurable and depends mainly
on the subordinates' skill and effort. [Ref.3:p 128]
Bass suggests that contingent reward is under-utilized as
a management style. He cites a 1983 study by Yankelovich and
Immerular that found 22% of 845 industrial workers interviewed
felt there was a direct relationship between performance and
pay. Additionally, 73% said their performance declined because
people got the same pay no matter how hard they worked. [Ref
.
3:p. 130]
Transactional Leadership may be productive and effective
or counter-productive and ineffective, but Bass feels that
transactional leadership cannot inspire people to do great
things or even dangerous things. Transformational leadership
can inspire people, it can change organizations, and it can
raise awareness. According to Bass,
. . . the transformational leader is one who motivates us
to do more than we originally expected to do. This
original performance expectation is based on our original
level of confidence in reaching the desired, designated
outcomes by means of our performance [Ref. 3:p. 20].
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Such a transformation can be achieved in any one of
three interrelated ways:
1. By raising our level of awareness, our level of
consciousness about the importance and vai.ue of
designated outcomes, and ways of reaching them.
2. By getting us to transcend our own self-interest
for the sake of the team, organization, or larger polity.
3. By altering our need level on Maslow's hierarchy
[of needs] or expanding our portfolio of needs and wants.
[Ref. 3:p. 20]
Bass goes on to point out the transformational leader does
not always transform for good; Hitler for example. Nor is
transformational leadership at opposite ends of the leadership
spectrum from transactional leadership. Leaders will often
show characteristics of both types of leadership with positive
contingent reinforcement being a good base to build off of.
Bass associates four characteristics with the transformational
leader: charisma, inspirational leadership, individualized
consideration, and intellectual stimulation. [Ref. 3:pp. 21-
118]
Charisma is that trait in some individuals that allows them
to motivate and inspire people through the intensity of their
personality. Charismatic leaders seem to surface in times of
stress and change, perhaps because these leaders are best able
to identify with the hopes and values of their followers. The
followers develop an emotional attachment to the charismatic
leader; they demonstrate enthusiasm and motivation for their
work and they strive to follow the example set by their
leader. Followers become involved with and committed to their
14
organization's goals. Their performance and confidence can
improve significantly. [Ref. 3:pp. 35-43]
Image is very important to the charismatic leade::. He must
(at least appear to) meet the expectations of his followers in
competence and morality. The charismatic leader also has self-
confidence and self-esteem. These characteristics oi: charisma
may not be rare; they may be suppressed by organizational
traits of conforming to standards and not risking failure in
order to succeed. [Ref. 3:pp. 44-45]
Leaders can be successful without having a charismatic
personality, and not all charismatic leaders are successful.
The charismatic leader can be transformational or
transactional but his effect on followers will be related to
how strong the other transformational traits are. Eiass feels
that both charismatic leaders will inspire their followers but
the transformational leader will most likely also be a
teacher, mentor, or coach. [Ref.3:pp. 49-52]
Inspirational leadership is closely associated with
charisma. As noted above, charismatic leaders inspire
motivation, and inspirational leadership is the chief way to
motivate. Inspirational leadership uses emotional appeals to
create a vision of organizational goals, a way to reach the
goals, and most importantly to give followers the confidence
to obtain those goals. The benefit of inspirational J.eadership
15
is to motivate followers to achieve performance and goals
above their expectations. [Ref. 3:pp. 62-68]
Confidence-building is the principal method for successful
inspirational leadership. Confidence is critically important
in the military. For men to succeed in the highly stressful
and uncertain environment of war, they must have confidence in
their weapons and other eguipment, their leaders' tactical
ability, their fellow men, and confidence in the support of
their country. They must have confidence in their own
abilities. [Ref.3:p. 69] Hayes and Thomas suggested that
"expectations of failure destroy morale. Confidence in victory
ensures it [Ref.3:p. 69]."
Next to building confidence, the inspirational leader must
be able to inspire belief in causes that are greatei: than the
individual. To be successful in this, the followers must have
values that can be related to the higher cause. In other
words, the "cause" must be seen as something worth sacrificing
or striving for and not something unworthy or unobtainable.
[Ref. 3:p. 70]
Another characteristic of transformational leadership is
individualized consideration. Individualized consideration
ranges in scope from appreciation of a job well done to
constructive criticism. In the transformational leader, this
consideration is focused on developing the full potential of
the subordinate. Part of this development process in realized
16
by the leader serving as a role model for his subordinates.
Another part of this process is delegation, which increases
the responsibilities of subordinates while helping them grow
to their full potential. The leader's role here would be one
of coach or mentor, allowing the subordinate the chance to
work out problems, make mistakes, and then learn and grow from
the process. Counseling is a major tool in showing i.ndividual
consideration and developing each junior; each subordinate has
different values and goals and should be treated differently
from all other subordinates -- each according to his needs and
desires. [Ref. 3:pp. 81-94]
Bass notes that individualized consideration mey present
problems in large organizations. As relationships develop
between leaders and subordinates, an "inner c.rcle" of
subordinates may emerge. This inner circle, being closer to
the leader, may receive more support and resources than those
outside of the inner circle. The inner circle members may then
become more committed to organizational goals, while the outer
circle members become more deviant from organizational goals.
The preferential treatment of one group can cause problems for
both groups and the organization. The inner circle members
rise and fall on the success and failure of the leader, and
they are expected to work harder than the others. The outer
circle members are less committed to the leader and feel they
are not treated equally. The two groups may not communicate or
17
coordinate well, resulting in lower productivity t.hroughout
the organization. While giving individualized consideration,
the leader must avoid creating an inner and outer circle of
subordinates. All subordinates, though treated individually,
should feel that they are part of the organization and the
leader is interested in their continued growth and
development. [Ref.3:p. 95]
A major component of the first three characteristics of
transformational leadership consists of emotional responses
between the leader and the subordinate. The fourth
characteristic of intellectual stimulation motivates
subordinates through reason and logic. The transformational
leader, using intellectual stimulation, enhances the ability
of subordinates to visualize and comprehend concepts and
problems, allowing subordinates to fully commit thenselves to
solving organizational troubles. Being an intellectual is not
enough, the leader must be able to stimulate the subordinate's
imagination. [Ref.3:pp. 98-101]
Intellectual stimulation is important when problems faced
by the organization are chaotic and ill-defined; when problems
effect the ability of the organization to reach its
objectives; and certainly when problems or situations threaten
the survival of the organization or its members -- such as
war. [Ref. 3:p. 103]
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The leader should have a higher intellect than his
subordinates, but not so much higher that he can't :-each them
or understand their needs. The rising quality of the enlisted
ranks should both require a higher quality officer and reduce
any potential gap in intellectual ability between the two
groups [Ref. 3:p. 104]. Bass cites several studies that
suggest that intelligence combined with experiencs is much
more effective than intelligence-lacking experience: in terms
of leadership effectiveness. These studies also found that
stress between the intellectual leader and his superior tends
to suppress the ability of that leader, especially if job
performance requires intelligence. [Ref. 3:p. 107]
The transformational leader may have one, some, or all of
the above characteristics. It is most likely that the
transformational leader will also use some transactional
leadership styles. However, as Castens [Ref. 15:pp. 45-47] and
Yammarino and Bass [Ref. 4:pp. 17-19] found, leaders who
demonstrated transformational traits (with or without
transactional traits) were seen to be more effective as
leaders by both superiors and subordinates.
Other studies support these conclusions about the
effectiveness of transformational leadership. Hoover, for
example, found that transformational styles correlated highly
with satisfaction and effectiveness, while transactional
19
styles were not significantly related to either leadership
outcome. [Ref. 12:pp. 44-45]
Transformational leadership has been investigated in a
military environment by Bass and Yammarino in their recent
study of 186 naval officers. The researchers found that
transformational leadership had the highest association, among
leadership styles, with leader effectiveness and sat. isfaction
with the leader as perceived by the subordinates. A smaller
but positive relationship was found between these leadership
outcomes and all transactional leadership styles except
passive management-by-exception, which was not related to the
outcomes. Non-leadership or a laissez-faire style had a
negative relationship with perceived effectiveness and
satisfaction. These three leadership styles followed the same
pattern of relationships (having lower magnitudes) with the
willingness of subordinates to put out extra effort. Bass and
Yammarino also found superiors' performance appraisals of
leaders were similarly correlated with leadership styles.
[Ref. 4:pp. 18-24]
The present research effort will investigate these
relationships on a sample of U.S. Marine Corps officers.
Leadership styles and outcomes as they relate to differences
in perception, unit cohesion and morale, and interest in




Hersey defines leadership style as "the pattern of
behavior (words or actions) of a leader as perceived by
others, suggesting that it is not important how leaders see
themselves but how others see them that counts, [lief. 16 :p.
27]
Bass and Yammarino, on the other hand, noted that
successful naval officers' perceived leadership styles were
more similar to their subordinates' perceptions of them than
were unsuccessful officers'. They also found self ratings
failed to predict performance while subordinate ratings were
predictive [Ref. 17:pp. 14-16]. Data will be collected to
examine these relationships in this thesis.
2. Cohesion
Leadership has a major impact on cohesion and morale.
The definition and importance of cohesion have been hard to
gain a consensus on. Luttwak describes it in his recent book
The Pentagon and the Art of War:
It is only when we visualize the terrible stress of
combat, in which survival and success so often depend on
the willingness of fighters to take risks for one
another, that we can appreciate the crucial importance of
"buddy solidarity" in the myriad of units, teams, and
crews that make up the Armed Forces as a whole. [Ref.
5:p. 143]
Griffin, in an unpublished concept paper, defines
cohesion as "the unity of effort of the individuals in an
organization toward the accomplishment of organizational goals
21
[Ref. 18 :p. 2]." Furthermore, he defines bonding as "the
natural and developed affective (social) and instrumental
(professional/technical competencies) relationships among the
members of an organization and/or between the organization and
its members [Ref. 18:p. 2]." Each type of bonding has three
dimensions associated with it, horizontal (peer), vertical
(leader) and organizational (unit). [Ref. 18:pp. 2-3] Bonding
is not cohesion because there is no unity effort toward the
accomplishment of the organization's goals. Johrs defines
cohesion as "the bonding together of individuals in an
organization or unit in such a way as to sustain -:heir will
and commitment to each other, their unit and the mission [Ref.
18 :p. 5]." Thus, bonding can lead to cohesion if t!ie efforts
of the bonded groups are directed toward organizational goals.
According to Griffen, "organizations and leaders have the
capability to influence bonding and shape the effort of
individuals toward organizational goals. Leaders develop
cohesion [Ref. 18:p. 6]." He is supported in this view by
Johns who states "... leadership is the most critical element
in achieving cohesive, effective organizations [Ref. 19 :p.
6]."
Bonding in an organization gives that organization the
potential for cohesion, and with cohesion greater performance.
But, as Griffen points out, until a leader recognizes,
22
develops, and uses that bonding, the organization's full
potential will go unrealized. [Ref. 18:p. 7]
Seashore viewed cohesiveness "... as a source of potent
influences that may or may not be marshalled in support of the
goals of the larger organization." And, that increasing
productivity in organizations is a function of the leader's
ability to develop a feeling of confidence and security in the
management of the organization [Ref. 19:pp. 101-102]."
Seashore's research results showed that highly cohesive groups
maintain more effective performance standards than groups with
low cohesion. However, the group standards may d'.ffer from
organizational standards depending on whether the group gets
support from the larger organization. [Ref. 19 :p. 30]
Seashore observed that cohesion can be developed if the
organization (leader) acts:
1) to lend prestige to the group's members
2) to structure the organization so there is
provision for groups of relatively small size;
3) to maintain a continuity in group membership over
a period of time, [ref 10:pp. 101-102]
Braun notes that cohesion cannot be viewed as a panacea
but clearly it can be employed as a very powerful tool.
Cohesion can enable units to increase training effectiveness,
readiness, job satisfaction, teamwork, and retention. Braun,
similar to Seashore, notes several conflicting studies that
23
show that "cohesiveness" or "highly cohesive groups" were
associated with lower productivity. [Ref. 20 :p. 27;
This effect has been seen in the military where groups
of troops who have served together for some time (i.e.,
bonded) often do not perform assigned hazardous duties such as
patrolling. The group goals -- surviving -- run contrary to
the organization's goal, but a leader who recognizes that
bonded group can turn them into a highly effective unit. [Ref.
20:p. 27] In spite of slight differences in the definition of
cohesion, the research demonstrates the impact of group unity
on performance, and supports the role of the Leader in
developing and directing cohesion.
3. Morale
Morale and its importance to combat ef fectiveness has
long been recognized by both great military leaders and
theorists. Napoleon said that the moral is to the physical as
three is to one [Ref. 21 :p 39] and Clausewitz wrote "... we
might say the physical are almost no more than the wooden
handle, whilst the moral are the noble metal, the real bright-
polished weapon [Ref. 22 :p. 252]."
S.L.A. Marshall wrote:
Morale is the thinking of an Army. It is the whole
complex body of an Army's thought: The way it feels about
the soil and about the people from which it springs. The
way that it feels about their cause and their politics as
compared with other causes and other politics. The: way it
feels about its friends and allies, as well as its
enemies. About its commanders and goldbricks. About food
and shelter. Duty and leisure. Payday and sex. Militarism
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and civilianism. Freedom and slavery. Work and want.
Weapons and comradeship. Bunk fatigue and drill.
Discipline and disorder. Life and death. God and the
evil. [Ref. 23:p. 158]
Marshall argues that good morale does not come from
discipline but suggests it is actually the other way around
[Ref. 23:p. 159]. Luttwak and Horowitz believe that Israeli
pilots had high morale mainly due to their elite status and
their tactical training, which emphasized "dogfight.Lng in the
manner of medieval knights" instead of push-button missile
tactics [Ref. 2:p. 200]. This suggests that if men feel
special and their training emphasizes the importance of their
actions then they would have high morale. It seems apparent
that psychology may play an important role in developing high
morale.
Hollander suggests that identification with the
organization and its goals can be instrumental in developing
high morale. He goes on to say, "in this respect, morale is a
psychological state of the individual which reflects his
dependence upon the group for certain satisfactions and
security [Ref. 12:p. 31]."
Rommel describes the relationship between leader and
morale as, "by skillful psychological handling, in which
personal example plays a principle part, the performance of
the troops can be increased enormously [Ref. 7:p. 518]." Adolf
von Schell agrees, saying "we know that psychology is
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tremendously important in war. It is a field unlimited in
extent, to which every conscientious soldier should give much
time and study [Ref. 25:p. 19]." Jomini maintained that
"military spirit depends on the skill of the commander and the
results from military institutions." He goes on tc say that
this "should be the object of the attention of every far-
seeing government [Ref. 26 :p. 56]."
Von Schell gives an account, repeated in The Infantry
Journal's "Infantry in Battle," in which he was able to
restore the morale and confidence of his men, shaken during a
nearby artillery barrage, by having the company barbsr cut his
hair during the barrage [Ref. 27 :p. 357]. The Infantry Journal
previews this (and other) accounts by saying,
the leader, by thinking objectively himself and by
causing his men to perform tasks involving thought and
movement, may successfully combat the intense mental
strain of battle. So too will simple, matter-of-fact
actions by a commander tend to instill in the men a sense
of confidence and security. [Ref. 27:p. 355]
A common theme throughout much of the literature is the
ability of the leader to maintain or restore confidence in his
men. Rommel believed that "the soldier must continually
receive fresh justification for his confidence [Ref. 7:p.
518]." In order to do this, "The commander must have contact
with his men. He must be capable of feeling and thinking with
them [Ref. 7:p. 226]." He also suggested that in sestting the
example, the higher the rank the better [Ref. 7:p. 241].
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Field Marshal Montgomery saw the real strength of an
array as being "far greater than the sum of its parts; that
extra strength is provided by morale, fighting spirit, by
mutual confidence between the leaders and the led, aid by many
other intangible spiritual gualities [Ref. 28 :p. 17]." He goes
on to say that if a leader can gain trust and confidence of
his men then he has the assets to achieve great things because
the battle is won by the spirit and morale of the junior
officers and men. [Ref. 28:p. 17]
Clausewitz found that in combat "the loss of morale was
the chief cause of the battle's conclusion [Ref. 22:p. 310]."
Jomini agrees by saying "no system of tactics cai lead to
victory when the morale of an army is bad [Ref. 26:p. 295]."
Montgomery concluded that "... the most important single
factor in war is morale.... In battle it is morale which
counts; no strategy can succeed without it. Once morale has
gone, defeat is inevitable [Ref. 28:p. 564]." If morale is
truly important and the leader can affect it to this extent,
studying and understanding the relationship between these two
concepts should play a bigger part in the training and
development of our military leaders.
4. History
The study of military history can help officers to gain
insight into the problems of today by leaning from
experiences of the past. It can also provide insight about
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enemies and allies by understanding the events that led up to
the present situation. Although technology changes, man does
not and man's responses and reactions to war are excellent
tools to look at expected behavior in combat.
The study of military history has brought tactical
innovation to the battlefield many times such as "Maurice of
Nassau devised tactical changes which Gustavas Adolphus
brilliantly put to the battlefield test [Ref. 29 :p. 31]." It
is certainly interesting to note different lessons learned
from World War I by the French and German Armies pr;.or to the
start of World War II. The Germans had concentrated
exhaustively on the study of the war, while the French had
not; since victory was their 's it seemed there were no lessons
to be learned. The Germans clearly demonstrated those lessons
to the French in 1940. [Ref. 29:pp. 31-39]
Field Marshal Montgomery quotes Mao Tse-tung saying,
All military laws and military theories which are in the
nature of principles are the experience of past wars
summed up by people in former days or in our own time. We
should seriously study these lessons, paid for in blood,
which are a heritage of past wars. That is one point. But
there is another. We should put these conclusions to the
test of our own experience, assimilating what is useful,
rejecting what is useless, and adding what is
specifically our own. The latter is very important, for
otherwise we cannot direct a war. Reading is learning,
but applying it is also learning and the more important
kind of learning at that [Ref. 28:p. 19].
Montgomery states that he agrees with Mao Tse-tung,
maintaining that both the study of war and then applying the
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study to battle are necessary for the development of military
leaders. He notes that there is a tremendous amount of
experience buried in military history, suggesting that "the
great captains have always been serious students of military
history [Ref. 28:pp. 19-21]."
Napoleon was more specific about military history,
saying that those who would learn the art of war should study
the Great Captains. S.L.A. Marshall suggests Napoleon's focus
was on the "manner in which Alexander, Caesar, anc. Hannibal
had sought the keys to military success is an understanding of
human nature and in the molding of its power to their tactical
and strategical purpose [Ref. 23:p. 160]."
More recently, General George S. Patton wrote,
To be a successful soldier you must know history. . . . What
you must know is how man reacts. Weapons change, but man
who uses them changes not at all. To win battles you do
not beat weapons -- you beat the soul of man, of the
enemy man. [Ref. 30:p. 107]
Golightly, in a recent Proceedings article, wrote,
History, it seems is dead. It strikes many as passe that
serving as a commissioned officer in the U.S. Military
involves us in a spectacular act of human spiri~, that
untold millions have given their lives to ensure its
success, or even that we may be called upon to do the
same. [Ref. 30:p. 107]
He goes on to suggest that the study of hist.ory gives
us the tradition upon which all leadership cmd moral
judgements can be based. [Ref. 30 :p. 107] However, Spector
maintains in a recent Navy Times article that history is more
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important than just preserving tradition, it is something that
leaders need to know. He suggests that it is an essential
ingredient in the professional development of officers. [Ref
.
31:p 10]
Luttwak notes only one area of expertise missing from
the long list of gualif ications held by the American officer
corps and that is warfare itself. He asks where; are the
tacticians and strategists? He claims that the military
academies treat military history -- "the only possible 'data
base' for those who would understand war -- ... in a
perfunctory manner as one subject among many." He is also
critical of the amount of military history covered in higher
level schools. He goes on to observe, "no wonder that the
distinguishing characteristic of American officers is their
lack of interest in the art of war [Ref.32:pp. 59-61]."
It seems strange that so little military history is
taught at the service schools, but perhaps what is needed is
a more systematic demonstration of the link between
appreciation of history and leader effectiveness.
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
Leadership seems to be the driving force in military
organizations, causing organizations to bond together into
cohesive fighting units, building unit morale and spirit, and
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finally molding and developing subordinates into future
leaders
.
By looking at active military units, a sense of what
leadership styles are being used by unit leaders and their
impact on the unit's effectiveness may be determined. The
following questions will guide the research effort and
hopefully aide in understanding the nature of leadership and
the effects of that leadership:




What is the effect of these styles on
subordinates' willingness to put out extra effort,
and which style is seen as effective?
3. What is the effect of these styles on unit
cohesion and morale.
4. Does the leader's perception of his own leadership
style, as compared to that of other observers,
relate to effective leadership?
5. What effect, if any, does military history have in
the development of military officers?
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III. METHODOLOGY
The data used in this thesis were derived from a series of
surveys given to focal officers and their superiors, peers,
and subordinates. The survey used was the Mi. ltifactor
Leadership Questionnaire (MLQ) developed by Bass end Avolio
from the Center for Leadership Studies and School of
Management at the State University of New York at E'.inghamton
[Ref. 33]. Additionally, the subordinate survey included eight
questions to measure group cohesiveness taken from a study by
Dobbins and Zaccaro [Ref. 34:pp. 208-209], which examined the
effects of group cohesiveness and leader behavior on
subordinate satisfaction in a military organization. The
superior survey also contained questions relating to how a
superior would rate the performance, morale, and cohesion of
the focal officer's unit. The survey administered to the focal
officer also included questions relative to t.he focal
officer's knowledge of military history and his views of its
importance.
All of the focal officers were male members of a Marine
Corps helicopter squadron serving as maintenance division
officers, department heads, or the squadron commander. There
were seven squadron commanders, all Lieutenant Colonel (0-5);
31 department heads, of which two were 1st Lieutenants (0-2),
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17 were Captains (0-3), and 12 were Majors (0-4 i; and 16
maintenance division officers, of which two wer= Warrant
Officers, one was a 2nd Lieutenant, four were 1st Lieutenants,
and nine were Captains. The 56 focal officers were all the
officers available who met the following criteria:
1) they were available to participate in the survey;
2) their superior officer was available to compLete
the survey;
3) they held a squadron billet of a commanding
officer, department head, or a maintenance
division officer.
The survey was conducted in each squadron's Ready Room. The
surveys were coded to ensure complete anonymity. The coding
identified the focal officer by billet and which of the four
surveys was used. Each focal officer completed a MLQ survey on
himself; each superior officer of the focal officer completed
a MLQ survey on the focal officer; one to five subordinates
completed the MLQ survey on each focal officer (one=32.7%,
two=30.9%, three=25.5%, four=9.1%, five=1.8%); and one to four
peers completed an MLQ survey on each focal officer
(one=29.4%, two=56.9%, three=11.8%, four=2%). Each squadron
contributed between four and eight focal officers.
The focal officers were from nine different helicopter
squadrons with four to eight focal officers per squadron (four
from one squadron, five from one, six from two, seven from
four, and eight from another squadron). Five of the nine
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squadrons were CH-53A/D/E squadrons and the other four were
CH-46E squadrons.
Ten of the focal officers had a bachelor's degree in
engineering, 14 had degrees in science/math, 12 had degrees in
history/political science, seven had business degrees, and 12
had another type of degree. The two warrant officer's did not
have bachelor's degrees.
The MLQ survey measures leadership on nine scales with
three leadership outcomes for the focal leader's self-
measurement as well as the subordinate and superior surveys,
and seven leadership scales and three leadership outcomes for
the peer surveys
.
The nine leadership scales used from the self, subordinate
and superior surveys are given below, divided into three
different leadership styles. Each scale is described by a
sample statement from the survey.
Transformational
1) Charisma (questions: 7, 16, 20, 44, 47, 47, 58) --
"Makes me proud to be associated with him/her."
2) Individualized Consideration (questions: 10, 13, 22, 33,
41, 54) -- "Treats me as an individual rather than just a
member of the group."
3) Intellectual stimulation (questions: 4, 8, 21, 32, 37,
38) -- "Gets me to use reasoning and evidence, rather than
unsupported opinion."
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4) Inspirational leadership (questions: 25, 27, 31, 40, 43,
55) -- "Provides a vision of what lies ahead."
Transactional
5) Contingent promises (questions: 1, 9, 51) -- "Talks
about special commendations and promotions for good work."
6) Contingent reward (questions: 23, 28, 45) — "Personally
pays me a compliment."
7) Active Management-by-Exception (questions: 5, 14, 19,
34) -- "If my work were to fall below par, he/she would point
it out to me .
"
8) Passive Management-by-Exception (questions: 2, 3, 12,




9) Laissez-Faire (questions: 15, 17, 35, 39, 49, 53) --
"Avoids making decisions."
The seven leadership scales derived from the peer survey
are given below, also divided into three leadership styles.
Transformational
1) Charisma (questions: 1, 10, 13, 21, 26, 28, 29, 31, 32,
33) -- "Makes me feel good to be around him/her."
2) Inspirational Leadership (questions: 14, 24, 40, 45, 51,




3) Intellectual stimulation (questions: 5, 12, 19, 35, 39,
44, 50, 56, 62, 68) -- "Stresses the use of intelligence to
overcome obstacles."
4) Individual consideration (questions: 3, 8, 15, 16, 25,




5) Contingent Reward (questions: 2, 9, 11, 20, 22, 42, 47,
53, 59, 65) -- "Clarifies the link between performance and
what the organization will provide in return for my
performance .
"
6) Management-by-Exception (questions: 4, 17, 23, 34, 38,




7) Laissez-Faire (questions: 7, 18, 30, 37, 41, 46, 52, 58,
67, 70) -- "If I don't bother him/her, he/she doesn't bother
me . "
The three leadership outcomes derived from -:he self,
subordinates, and superior surveys are identified below.
1) Extra effort by the subordinate (questions: 2'5, 46, 50,
56) -- "I do more than I am expected to do in my work."
2) Satisfaction of the leader by the subordinate




3. Effectiveness of the leader (questions: 59, 60, 61, 62)
-- "How effective is this officer in meeting the requirements
of the command.
"
The three leadership outcomes derived from the peer survey
are:
1) Extra effort (questions: 6, 36, 57)
2) Satisfaction (questions: 74, 75, 76, 77)
3) Effectiveness (questions: 78, 79)
The above questions for each scale or outcome were first
converted to a five point index indicating how often the
behavior related to the question was observed as follows:
zero - "not at all; '
one - "once in a while;
"
two - "sometimes;"
three - "fairly often;"
four - "frequently if not always."
The value for each question was summed for each scale or
outcome and a mean was calculated giving the average value for
each.
The superior officer of each focal officer was asked to
rate the performance, morale, and cohesion of "he focal
officer's unit, department, or division (questions, 73, 74, 75
from the superior survey, respectively) .
The subordinates of each focal officer were asked to
evaluate the morale (question 79 of the subordinate form) and
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cohesion (questions 71 through 78 of the subordinate form) of
the unit, department, or division controlled by the focal
officer.
Each of the ratings from both superiors and subordinates
were converted to a five point format ranging from zero (very
low) to four (very high). For the subordinate's cohesion
factor, each of the values of the cohesion quest.ions were
summed and then the mean was determined to yield an average
measure of cohesion for each focal officer.
The difference in perception, between the subordinates'
perception of leadership styles and the focal officer's own
perception of those styles was investigated in this thesis.
This difference was defined as the difference between either
the subordinates' or the superiors' perceptions of Leadership
style and the focal officer's perception.
Each focal officer was asked to evaluate the "importance
of military history in developing effective officers." Of
those that responded (n=56), 32.1% saw military history as
"essential," 32.1% rated military history as "important,"
30.4% rated it as "helpful," 5.4% saw military history as
being "indifferent," and there were no responses indicating
that military history was viewed as "harmful." Each focal
officer was also asked to rate his own "knowledge of military
history." Of those that responded (n=56), 21.4% rated their
knowledge as "very good," 25.0% rated it as "good," 39.3%
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rated it as "fair," 14.3% rated it as "poor," and no one rated
their knowledge as "very poor."
Table 1 presents a list of the variables used in this study
along with the survey from which the variables were derived.
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TABLE 1. LIST OF VARIABLES
Survey derived SELF SUPERIOR SUBORDINATE PEER
Variable
LEADERSHIP STYLES
CHARISMA SFCH SPCH SBCH PRCH
INSPIRATIONAL
LEADERSHIP
SFIL SPIL SBIL PRIL
INTELLECTUAL
STIMULATION
SFIS SPIS SBIS PRIS
CONTINGENT REWARD
(PROMISE)
SFCR1 SPCR1 SBCR1 PRCR1
CONTINGENT REWARD
(REWARD)
SFCR2 SPCR2 SBCR2 PRCR2
MANAGEMENT-BY-
EXCEPTION (ACTIVE)




SFMBE P SPMBE P SMBBE P PRMBEP
LAISSEZ FAIRE SFLF SPLF SBLF PRLF
LEADERSHIP
OUTCOMES
EXTRA EFFORT SFEE SPEE SBEE PREE
EFFECTIVENESS SFEE SPEF SBEF PREF
SATISFACTION SFSAT SPSAT SBSAT PRSAT
UNIT OUTCOMES
UNIT COHESION RCOHESN COHESION











IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
This section presents a discussion of the leadership styles
and outcomes found in the Marine Corps squadrons, sampled.
Descriptive statistics and Pearson correlations we::e used to
examine the questions asked in this study.
Table 2 presents the leadership styles used by the leaders
of the subject units. The descriptive statistics and
correlations between the leadership styles and all outcomes
are presented in Tables 3 through 6. These tables summarize
the results derived from the subordinate, superior, self, and
peer data, respectively. Table 7 presents the correlations
between leadership outcomes (subordinates' extra effort,
leader effectiveness, and satisfaction with the leader) and
unit outcomes (cohesion, morale, and performance). Tables 8
and 9 show how differences in perception relate to subordinate
extra effort and leader effectiveness. Table 10 presents the
relationship between military history and unit outcomes.
The first questions of interest concerned the extent to
which each leadership style is perceived as present in the
sample. Table 2 shows how frequently each leadership style was
perceived by each group of observers. The average rating of
each leadership style was computed and the styles were ranked,
beginning with the style most often observed. Although the
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order of ranking is slightly different, subordinates and
superiors generally agreed on which leadership styles made up
the top three, middle three, and bottom three styles present
in their squadrons. Individual consideration was consistently
second while management-by-exception and contingent
reinforcement (reward) switched between first and third.
Laissez-faire was the least often observed leadership style.
TABLE 2. LEADERSHIP STYLE RANKING BY OBSERVER
OBSERVER






























5 Charisma Inspirational Leadership Charisma Intellectual
Stimulation















9 Laissez-Faire Laissez-Faire Laissez-Faire
(A) = Active (P) = Passive (1) = Promises (2) = Rewards
Note: data derived from MLQ surveys
Interestingly, peers had a completely different perception
of the leadership styles used by their coworkers. They ranked
charisma first and inspirational leadership last. It is likely
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that these findings result from defining peers by billet
instead of rank. A senior major department head has little in
common, socially or otherwise, with a young captain department
head 13 years junior. Another consideration is tha - : peers in
this situation are probably not as close as peers in an
academic or training environment. Finally, the peer
guestionnaire, while similar to the other questionnaires, is
not the same. For example, this survey does not separate
either contingent reinforcement or management-by -exception
into their two component parts
.
Tables 3 through 6 are concerned with the next two research
questions, dealing with the relationship bet.ween (1)
leadership and leadership outcomes and (2) leadership and unit
outcomes
.
As shown in Table 3, subordinates were more likely to exert
extra effort for leaders who demonstrated the transformational
leadership styles of charisma, intellectual stimulation, and
inspirational leadership. Surprisingly, the transformational
style of individual consideration did not seem to induce
subordinates to put out extra effort although it was ranked
second in Table 2. This suggests that while .Individual
consideration was a common leadership style, little was gained
by the use of this style in terms of extra effort by
subordinates. Bass notes the difficulties that can arise with
this style, especially if the leader inadvertently develops an
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"inner group" of subordinates and an "outer group" who do not
feel as committed to the leader's goals [Ref. 3:p. 95]. The
"inner group" are transformed by the leader and exert extra
effort to accomplish organizational goals, whereas the "outer
group" may feel so alienated that the amount of e::fort they
exert falls below normal levels.
Neither of the transactional styles nor the non- Leadership
style of laissez-faire produced any extra effoirt by the
subordinates. The transactional leadership resui: was not
particularly surprising since the main thrust of transactional
leadership is to gain expected results by giving the
subordinates previously agreed to rewards for their efforts.
The laissez-faire style was expected to have a negative
effect, which it did but the relationship was not significant.
TABLE 3. CORRELATIONS BETWEEN LEADERSHIP STYLES AND OUTCOMES -
SUBORDINATES
OUTCOMES
STYLES SBEE SBEF SBSAT COHESION MORALE MEAN S.D.
SBCH .48*" .77'" .78***
.16 .37*" 2.68 .67
SBIC .09 .48*** .48*" .33*" .34*" 2.80 .49
SBIS .35*** .58*** .58"' .24* .33*" 2.69 .55
SBIL .45"* .59"" .57*** .46*** .57*" 2.49 .56
SBCR1 .06 .29** .30** .29** .39** 1.63 .76
SBCR2 .21 .29** .36*** 29*" .28" 2.72 .77
SBMBE A .16 .13 .10 .12 .07 2.85 .60
SBMBE P -.13 -.02 .25* .07 -.04 2.41 .61
SBLF -.12 -.22* - 29" .02 .01 1.32 .51
Note: * significance level of .1
" significance level of .05
"'significance level of .01
n = 56
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Subordinates' perceptions of leader effectiveness were
strongly related to all the transformational styles,
especially charisma. The transactional styles of contingent
reinforcement (both promises and rewards) were also related to
effective leadership, though not as strongly as the
transformational styles. Neither of the management-by-
exception styles were statistically significant, however
laissez-faire was negatively correlated with leader
effectiveness. This indicates that subordinates viewed
transformational leadership styles as more effective than the
other styles, and laissez-faire leadership as less effective.
Similarly, the subordinates seemed more satisfied with the
transformational leadership, especially a charismatic leader,
than the transactional leader; they were less satisfied with
the laissez-faire leader. These results are generally
consistent with Bass [Ref. 3] and Bass and Yammarino [Ref.
4: pp. 17-18].
The unit outcomes of cohesion and morale, as perceived by
the subordinates, were significantly related to both
transformational leadership styles and the contingent
reinforcement styles of transactional leadership. Two points
of interest were the lack of a significant relationship
between charisma and unit cohesion, and the much stronger
relationship between inspirational leadership and both
cohesion and morale. Charisma is a tie between leader and
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follower and not between the follower and the group. Perhaps
this suggests that unit cohesion is, at least partially, built
from a vision of the unit and its goals and not the
personality of the leader. The impact of inspirational
leadership on cohesion and morale is interesting considering
the subordinates saw it as one of the styles used least
frequently. This might hint at the real power of inspirational
leadership to develop cohesive units.
From the superior's perspective, the extra effort of the
focal officer's subordinates was positively related to all of
the transformational styles and the contingent reinforcement
(both promises and rewards) styles of transactional
leadership, as shown in Table 4. The laissez-faire style was
negatively related to subordinates' extra effort. The
relationship between contingent reinforcement (reward) and the
superior's perception of the subordinates' extra effort was
almost as strong for charisma, and stronger than the other
transformational styles. The superior's view that subordinates
appear willing to put out extra effort if the leader
reinforces performance with tangible rewards was not
consistent with subordinates' perceptions as seen in Table 3,
but it may give an indication of what style these superiors
either wanted or expected to see.
Superiors viewed the focal officers as effective leaders
most often when transformational, contingent reinforcement
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(reward), or management-by-exception (active) Leadership
styles were used. It seems that superiors believed that these
two transactional modes were very effective leadership styles;
very close in effectiveness to the transformational styles.
Particularly interesting was the relatively high relationship
of management-by-exception (active), which seems to be a style
the superiors valued. Superiors saw the focal cfficer as
ineffective when management-by-exception (passive) or laissez-
faire styles were used.
TABLE 4. CORRELATIONS BETWEEN LEADERSHIP STYLES AND OUTCOMES
SUPERIOR
OUTCOMES
STYLES SPEE SPEF SPSAT RCOHESN" RMORALE MEAN S.D.
SPCH .52*** .83*** .79*** .70*** .51*** 2 72 .80
SPIC .32*** .63*** .66*** .24* .31** 3.11 .65
SPIS .45*** .68*** .72*** .40*** .34** 2.54 .73
SPIL .55*** .71*"* .74*** .48*** .51*** 2.57 .67
SPCR1 .25* .17 .23 .10 .03 2.28 .91
SPCR2 .51*** .64*** .69*** .36*** .54*** 3.22 .54
SPMBE
AS
.13 .49*** .54*" .19 .08 2.87 .74
SPMBE P -.23 -.40*** -.35** -.26* -.30* 2.02 .98
SPLF -.24* -.52*** -.49**' -.52*** -.46*** 1.23 .81
Note: * significance level of .1
** significance level of .05
'** significance level of .01
n = 49
Similarly, superiors were most satisfied with the focal
officer who had transformational, contingent reinforcement
(rewards), or management-by-exception (active) Leadership
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styles. Again, superiors were less satisfied with the
leadership of the focal officer who used management -by-
exception (passive) or laissez-faire leadership styles.
Unit cohesion and morale, as judged by the superiors,
followed the same pattern as above, with transformational,
contingent reinforcement (reward), and management-by -exception
(active) styles positively correlated to both. Management-by-
exception (passive) and laissez-faire styles, as above, were
both negatively correlated with unit cohesion and morale. The
high relationships of contingent reinforcement (reward) and
management-by-exception (active) with both leadership and unit
outcomes may suggest the superiors used these styles
themselves and looked favorably upon their juniors who used
similar styles.
A comparison of Tables 2, 3, and 4 reveals a few notable
conflicting perceptions . Management-by-exception (active) was
seen as a frequently used style in this sample by subordinates
and superiors. However, while subordinates saw no relation
between this style and any of the leadership or unit outcomes,
superiors rated it as highly related to leader effectiveness
and satisfaction with the leader. Additionally, contingent
reinforcement (rewards), which came out high in the frequency
rating shown in Table 2, had a different relationship to
outcomes when evaluated by subordinates as compared to
superiors. The data from both sets of observers shows
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significant relationships between this style and outcomes
(except that subordinates did not relate extra effort to
contingent rewards), but the correlations were considerably
higher from the superior's point of view. Subordinate notions
of contingent rewards were similar to those of contingent
promises, unlike superiors who placed a much higher value on
the former style.
Charisma was highly valued in most outcomes, and from both
points of view, yet not seen as a frequently used style.
Finally, the only agreement across all three tables was on the
lack of relationship between laissez-faire styles and positive
outcomes, and that this style was seen as used least
frequently by the leaders in this sample.
From the focal officers' view point described ii Table 5,
subordinates were willing to exert extra effort for those
leaders who saw themselves as using transformational or
contingent reinforcement (both promises and rewards)
leadership styles. Laissez-faire was negatively related to
the effort of subordinates.
Focal officers who saw themselves as transformational also
viewed themselves as being more effective as a leader and as
more satisfied with their leadership style as compared to
leaders with other styles. Again, laissez-faire produced the
opposite effect. Transactional leadership styles did not
significantly correlate with the leader's perception of his
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effectiveness or satisfaction with leadership, unlike their
superiors' perceptions. Focal officer judgements of contingent
reinforcement (rewards) were similar to contingent
reinforcement (promises). This was also seen in the
subordinate data while superiors evaluated the styles as very
different with respect to outcomes. Focal officers, however,
saw either style as related to extra effort, while
subordinates did not.
TABLE 5. CORRELATIONS BETWEEN LEADERSHIP STYLES AND OUTCOMES
SELF
OUTCOMES
STYLES SFEE SFEF SFSAT RCOHESX RMORALE MEAs S.D.
SFCH .59*'" .61"* .66"* .13 .13 2.75 .63
SFIC .60*** .53*** .42"* •>-]*• .13 3.12 .47
SFIS .40"" .51*** .56"* .24* .16 2.97 .53
SFIL .60*"* .58*'* .38"* .26**
.20 2.74 .50
SFCR1 .32** .05 .10 .10 .03 2.17 .90
SFCR2 5 j... .19 .16 .25" .08 3.38 .60
SFMBE A .16 .13 .02 -.12 -.26" 2.78 .67
SFMBE P -.004 -.15 -.15 -.23* -.39*" 2.23 .87
SFLF -.22* -.45*** -.40*" . IT
-.17 1.10 .55
Note: * sign iticance level c»1 .1 n = 57
" significance level of .05
*** significance level of .01
Transformational leadership styles as viewed by the focal
officers, were positively related with their superior's view
of unit cohesion. Interestingly, charisma was the exception to
this finding, and consistent with subordinates' evaluations if
not the superior's. Contingent reinforcement (rewarc.) was also
50
positively related to unit cohesion (and this was .also found
in the subordinate and superior data), while laissez-faire and
management-by-exception (passive) were negatively related to
unit cohesion. There were no significant relationships with
subordinates' perceptions of unit cohesion or morale so those
data are not shown here.
From the focal officer's perspective, the only influence
of leadership style on unit morale as evaluated by the
superior, was the negative relationship of management-by-
exception (both types) leadership styles to unit morale. It
seems curious that there were no statistically significant
positive relationship between the focal officer's perception
of his leadership styles and the superior's evaluation of unit
morale. Of course, this seeming lack of a relationship could
simply reflect the difference in perception between the focal
officers and their superior. If cohesion and mcrale were
judged from the focal officer's view point, the findings might
be more in line with expectations.
As noted in Chapter 3, the peer guestionnairs did not
permit separating contingent reinforcement and management-by-
exception into their two component parts. The peers of the
focal officer, as shown in Table 6, viewed both
transformational and contingent reinforcement Leadership
styles as having a positive impact on all three Leadership
outcomes: 1) extra effort by subordinates, 2) effective
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leadership, and 3) satisfaction with leadership. Management-
by-exception did not have a significant impact whils laissez-
faire was consistently negative with respect to Leadership
outcomes. Like the subordinate and focal officer data, the
higher correlations resulted with respect to transformational
styles; and, like all observers, high value was placed on
charisma
.
TABLE 6. CORRELATIONS BETWEEN LEADERSHIP STYLES AND OUTCOMES
PEER
OUTCOMES
STYLES PREE PREF PRSAT COHESION MORALE MEAN S.D.
PRCH .60*** .83*** .85*" .26* .11 2.63 .76
PRIC .lb"* .58*** .62*** .25* .18 2.30 .67
PRIS .70*** .52*** .59*" .04 -.03 2.05 .74
PRIL .77*** .39*" .41"* .15 .09 1.60 .88
PRCR .59*** .31** .39*" .08 .14 2.13 .70
PRMBE -.01 .16 .18 -.25* -.13 •> 03 .59
PRLF -.54*" -.57*** -.46*" -.28** -.03 1.80 .56
Note: * significance level of .1 n = 32
** significance level of .05
*** significance level of .01
Unit cohesion, as judged by subordinates, was correlated
with charisma and individual consideration, while management-
by-exception and laissez-faire leadership styles resulted in
a perception of lower unit cohesion. Unit morale, as viewed by
the subordinates, was not influenced by any leadership style
as seen by the focal officer's peers. However, unit norale, as
judged by the superior (not shown on table), was significantly
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and negatively related (-.24) to laissez-faire; all other
relationships with the superior's perception of unit morale
were not significant.
Generally, all observers saw transformational Leadership
as positively related to leadership outcomes; contingent
reinforcement (active) was the only transactional style with
a consistent, positive relationship to leadership outcomes. A
similar relationship existed for unit outcomes but the
relationship was stronger and more consistent if Leadership
styles and unit outcomes were perceived from the same vantage
point, e.g., subordinate perceptions of leadership styles
related better to subordinate perceptions of unit cohesion and
morale than did focal officer perceptions of style compared to
superior perceptions of unit outcomes. The laissez-faire style
was universally negative in relationship with these two
outcomes. Looking at the mean for each perceived Leadership
style, the focal officers saw themselves as more
transformational and less laissez-faire than did others
evaluating their leadership styles.
It was interesting to note that subordinates we::e willing
to put out extra effort only for transformational leaders
(except individual consideration), with charisma and
inspirational leadership as the most productive. TJlis was in
contrast with the views of the focal officer and superior,
which indicated that contingent reinforcement (rewards) was
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also a highly productive style with respect to extra effort.
One explanation of this contrast is merely that there were
different perceptions between the groups of observers;
however, one possible explanation could be differences in
expectations. The focal officer and the superior night have
lower expectations than the subordinates. Therefore, what they
see as "extra effort" is really the fulfillment of what the
subordinates see as the "contract" associated with the
contingent reinforcement style. It seems odd that the
subordinates would have higher expectations of their
performance than either the focal officer or his superior.
The relationships between leadership styles and both
leadership and unit outcomes were discussed above, hut what is
the relationship between the two sets of outcomes? Table 7
shows the correlations between leadership outcomes, derived
from all four sources, and unit outcomes derived from
subordinate and superior questionnaires.
Subordinates' extra effort related to all unit outcome
measures, except their own perception of morale, suggesting
they did not see a relationship between their willingness to
put out extra effort and the morale of their unit.
Subordinates' views of unit morale were associated with
effective leadership and satisfaction with the focal officer's
leadership. From the superior's view point, extra effort by
the subordinates was related to unit cohesion, unit norale and
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unit performance. Similarly, effective leadership and superior
satisfaction with observed leadership were associated with all
three unit outcomes.
The focal officers saw subordinates' extra effort and
effective leadership as related to unit morale (as judged by-
subordinates) and unit cohesion (as judged by superiors).
Effective leadership was also related to the superior's view
of unit morale.
TABLE 7. CORRELATIONS BETWEEN LEADERSHIP OUTCOMES AND UNIT
OUTCOMES
OUTCOMES
OUTCOMES COHESION MORALE RCOHESX RMORALE RPERFORM
SBEE 23* .20 .30" .27" n»
SBEF .18 .41*" .21 .17 .14
SBSAT .16 .31" ii .21 .08
SPEE .08 .07 .60*" .72*" .66*"
SPEF .08 .10 .65"* .61*" .61"*
SPSAT .02 .05 .55*** .55"* .71*"
SFEE .17 T>« 22* .06 .01
SFEF .16 .24* .32" .27" .17
SFSAT .03 .18 .21 .18 .11
PREE .16 .09 .08 .03 .03
PREF .37" .18 .03 -.08 .11
PRSAT .30" .20 -.02 . 11 .02
Note: * significance level of .1
** significance level of .05
"'significance level of .01
n = 56
Subordinates' views of unit cohesion were relatec to leader
effectiveness as seen from the peers' perspective as well as
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to the peers' satisfaction with the focal officer's Leadership
style.
The only reasonable comparisons that could be made were
between the perceptions of subordinates and superiors, since
unit outcomes were judged just from these two view points.
Superiors judged a much stronger association between all
leader outcomes and all unit outcomes, than did subordinates
who only saw relationships between unit cohesion and their
extra effort, and unit morale as a function of effective
leadership and satisfaction with that leadership.
The results to this point indicate major differences in
perceptions of leadership styles and outcomes. Because of the
important relationship between subordinates and focal officers
and between superiors and focal officers, these differences in
perception need to be investigated further.
Table 8 describes the correlations between different
perceptions of leadership and leadership outcomes, oy looking
at the differences in perceived leadership style between
subordinates and the focal officers, and between ths superior
and focal officers. For example, the difference in the
perception between subordinates and the focal officer of a
particular leadership style was evaluated. These relationships
were investigated because subordinates and superiors , far more
than peers, are the "significant others" to the focal
officers. A leader who perceives himself as havirg more or
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less of a particular style than others perceive in him is the
issue addressed here. Differences in perception were defined
as others' perceptions minus the focal officer's own
perceptions. For example, if the subordinates' average rating
of the leader's charisma was 2.5 and the focal officer saw
himself as a 3.0, the difference in perception would be -.05.
This difference was then correlated with leadership outcomes
to determine if a relationship existed between the two.
The relationship between different perceptions (between
subordinates and focal officers) of charisma, inspirational
leadership, and intellectual stimulation leadership styles was
positively related to subordinate extra effort while
contingent promises was negatively related with extra effort.
Different perceptions (between subordinates and focal
officers) of leadership style were significantly related to
leader effectiveness for all transformational styles and the
proactive transactional styles of management-by -exception
(active) and contingent reinforcement (rewards). In other
words, if the difference in perception for charisma was
positive (i.e., the focal officer saw himself as less
charismatic than the subordinates saw him) , then the leader
was seen to be more effective by the subordinates.
The same pattern of results was found concerning
subordinates' satisfaction with leadership except that neither
individual consideration nor active management-by -exception
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were significantly related. Passive management -by -exception
was negatively related to satisfaction.
Different perceptions (between superiors and focal
officers) of charisma, inspirational leadership, and
intellectual stimulation leadership styles were positively
related to subordinate extra effort. Additionally, contingent
rewards and promises were also related to extra effort.
TABLE 8. CORRELATIONS BETWEEN DIFFERENT PERCEPTIONS OF
LEADERSHIP STYLES AND LEADERSHIP OUTCOMES
OUTCOMES
PERCEPTION SUBORDINATE - SELF SUPERIOR - SELF
STYLE SBEE SBEF SBSAT SPEE SPEF SPSAT
DIFFCH .39*** .56*" .58*" .31" .61*** .60*"
DIFFIC -.11 .29** .21 .12 .48*** .51*"
DIFFIS .28** .34** .42**' .31" .48*" .58*"
DIFFIL .31" .35*" .36*** .30** .53*** .63***
DIFFCR1 -.14 -.07 .02 .25* .07 .15
DIFFCR2 .09 .23* .25* .31** .48"* .51"*
DIFFMBEA .04 .13 .04 .13 .56*" .52***
DIFFMBEP -.07 -.18 .03 -.10 -.23 -.24*
DIFFLF .11 -.06 -.08 -.11 -.37*** -.30"
Note: * significan ce level of. 1 n = 56
** significan
*** significan
ce level of .05
ce level of .01
Different perceptions (between superiors and focal
officers) of leadership style were significantly related to
leader effectiveness for all transformational styles and the
proactive transactional styles of management-by -exception
(active) and contingent reinforcement (rewards). Laissez-faire
58
was found to be negatively related. The same pattern of
results was found concerning superior's satisfaction with
leadership except that passive management-by-exc€:ption was
also negatively related to satisfaction.
These findings suggest that officers who rate ihemselves
below what others rate them on how often they use
transformational leadership styles are more likely to be
associated with effective leadership than officers; who rate
themselves above what others rate them.
Bass and Yammarino [Ref. 17:pp. 14-16] suggest that the
magnitude of the difference in perception should be negatively
related to leadership outcomes. Table 9 shows this
relationship between the magnitude (absolute value) of
different perceptions and leadership outcomes, laking the
example used above, if the subordinates' average rating for
charisma was 2.5 and the focal officer saw himself as a 3.0,
then difference in perception would be -0.5, but the magnitude
would be +0.5. This difference was then correlated with
leadership outcomes to determine if a relationship existed
between the two.
Generally, leaders with perceptions that differ from their
subordinates or superiors are seen as less effective as a
leader by both groups. This is particularly true for the
transformational styles.
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These findings indicate that self perception is important,
contrary to Hersey's suggestion that only subordinates'
perceptions of leadership were important in determining the
outcomes of leadership [Ref. 16 :p. 27]. Bass and Yammarino
found that leaders with similar perceptions to tha - : of other
observers were seen as more effective, while the findings here
suggest that there may be different relationships for
negatively viewed leadership styles like passive management-
by-exception [Ref. 17:pp. 14-16].
TABLE 9. CORRELATIONS BETWEEN DIFFERENT PERCEPTIONS OF
LEADERSHIP STYLES AND LEADERSHIP OUTCOMES (ABSOLUTE VALUE)
OUTCOMES
PERCEPTION SUBORDINATE - SELF SUPERIOR - SELF
STYLE SBEE SBEF SBSAT SPEE SPEF SPSAT
DIFFCH .03 _ ->->• -.35*" .16 -.06 -.06
DIFFIC -.20 -.18 -.17 .17 -.21' -.38*"
DIFFIS -.11 _ 48 ... -.37*** -.11 -.38'" -.52*"
DIFFIL -.18 -.30" -.25* -.05 _ 49 ... -.55"*
DIFFCR1 -.11 -.15 .11 .18 .19 .01
DIFFCR2 .02 -.16 -.20 .05 -.25* -.36*"
DIFFMBEA .10 .07 -.04 -.13 -.13 -.26'
DIFFMBEP .05 .17 .05 .23 .30" ->g«*




ce level of .1
ce level of .05
ce level of .01
n = 56
The two tables presented in the appendix show the
intercorrelations between the leadership outcomes derived from
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all four questionnaires. They illustrate the major differences
between each group of observers.
The last question discussed in this study dealt with the
importance of military history in the development of military
officers. The only significant relationship betw€;en either
military history variable (self -rated knowledge of history or
considered importance of history in officer development ) and
leadership outcomes was with the focal officer's own view of
his effectiveness as a leader and satisfaction with his
leadership style. Knowledge of military history was positively
related to both effectiveness and satisfaction while the
importance of military history was only related to
satisfaction. Apparently, focal officers that knew military
history also saw themselves as effective leaders.
Table 10 presents the correlations between the focal
officers' view of both military history variables and unit
outcomes. As shown, only knowledge of military histcry had any
relationship to unit outcomes. It is interesting that this
knowledge only related to the subordinates' perception of
cohesion and morale and not the superiors' perceptions. This
relationship might suggest that leaders with a good knowledge
of military history may also realize the importance of unit
cohesion and morale, since that is one of the key lessons
history teaches, and actively pursue these two unit outcomes.
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TABLE 10. CORRELATIONS BETWEEN MILITARY HISTORY AND UNIT
OUTCOMES
OUTCOMES
OUTCOMES COHESION MORALE RCOHESN" RMORALE RPERFORM
I_MILHIS -.03 .05 .10 -.01 -.02
K_MILHIS .24* .28*' .19 .06 .03
Note: * significa rice level of .1 n = 56
** significance level of .05
*** significance level of .01
These findings are far from conclusive and may rssult from
the general lack of knowledge characteristic of the American
military officer corps [Ref. 6:pp. 294-296]. Over 30% of the
officers surveyed had a "fair" amount or less of knDwledge on
this subject, while only 21.4% rated their knowledge as "very
good." Certainly, this apparent lack of knowledge of military
history is surprising for professional military officers.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of this thesis was to determine the Leadership
styles used in the Marine Corps squadrons sampled and to find
any relationships that might exist between these styles and
positive outcomes as viewed by the leaders, or focal officers,
as well as their superiors, peers, and subordinates. The
leadership outcomes of subordinate extra effort, leader
effectiveness, and satisfaction with the leader were
considered in addition to unit outcomes of cohesion and
morale. Several themes emerged from the results of this study
along with interesting areas for further research.
Despite the small sample size obtained for this research,
the results followed the general pattern of findings by Bass
[Ref. 3:pp. 11-17], and Yammarino and Bass [Ref. 4:pp. 18-19].
Transformational leadership was found to be most often
associated with subordinate extra effort and effective
leadership. The transactional styles of contingent
reinforcement (reward) and management-by-exception (active)
were also associated with effective leadership. Management-
by-exception (passive) and laissez-faire styles e:.ther were
not associated with effective leadership or were related
negatively to effective leadership. Thus, similar patterns of
63
leadership have been seen in samples of Navy and Marine Corps
leaders
.
While all observers placed a high value on transformational
leadership styles, these styles were not perceived as those
most frequently utilized by the leaders in these squadrons.
One exception to this was the transformational style of
individualized consideration, which was rated by all observers
as the second most frequently used style in the sample. Oddly
enough, however, this was the only transformational style for
which subordinates said they did not exert extra effort.
Similarly, subordinates saw inspirational leadership as highly
related to unit cohesion and morale, but this styi.e was not
perceived as one frequently used by the focal leaders.
The data used in this study do not represent cold, hard
facts but rather perceptions from different view points. No
one perception can claim to represent the "true" picture of
the world, but each perception is interesting when considered
in the context of its source. Of particular interest were the
differences in perceptions among subordinates, superiors, and
focal officers. For example, subordinates were willing to put
out extra effort only for transformational leaders (except for
the style of individual consideration), while focaL officers
and superiors also viewed contingent reinforcement as a highly
productive style. Additionally, superiors rated management-
by-exception (active) as strongly related to leader
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effectiveness and satisfaction with the leader. One area for
which there was almost total agreement was that laissez-faire
and management-by-exception (passive) leadership styles were
not related to positive outcomes, nor were these styles
freguently used by leaders from the squadrons.
Subordinates and superiors felt that, in general, cohesion
and morale were related positively to transformational
leadership and contingent reinforcement (rewards, with
subordinates also including promises). Focal leader and peer
results showed no relationships between leadership style and
positive unit cohesion and morale. Neutral to negative
relationships were found between the two styles of management-
by-exception (passive) and laissez-faire with respect to
cohesion and morale. The finding held for all observers, as
mentioned above. The concepts of cohesion and morale are very
abstract and the questions used to measure them in this study
may not have been optimal for providing clarification.
The final issue of interest in this study concerned the
role of knowledge or rated importance of military history with
respect to leadership and unit outcomes. This issue has been
given considerable attention in writings by military leaders.
It cannot be concluded that these data provided strong support
for a positive and consistent set of relationships among these
factors; neither should such relationships be ruled out. The
results showed that leaders who knew military history saw
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themselves as effective leaders. Additionally, these leaders
may realize the importance of cohesion and morale, since that
is one of the key lessons history teaches, and actively pursue
these outcomes. A larger sample size may have provided more
definitive findings.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
An interesting question not investigated in th:.s thesis,
is whether or not leadership styles change with increased
rank. This question would investigate either how :he Marine
Corps molds its leaders over time, or give some indication of
what types of leadership styles the Marine Corps tends to
keep. A larger sample size would be required to look at this
question.
The results of peer perceptions were not given much
emphasis in this study due to problems noted with a
questionnaire not totally compatible with that given to other
participants, and the fact that "peers" were derived by billet
as opposed to rank. While this definition of peer may be
acceptable in the civilian community, the rank structure is so
important in the military that rank must be the basis for any
future survey of peers in this environment.
Researching other units and different types of units would
be helpful in determining styles across communities in the
Marine Corps. Although unit cohesion and morale are important
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to all units, it seems critical to ground comtat units.
Therefore, a study in this area could prove very interesting
and informative.
Different instruments for measuring unit outcomes should
be sought to give a more accurate view of cohesion and morale.
For example, Griffen's instrument for unit cohesion [Ref . 18]
might be useful since it considers both cohesion and bonding.
Unit reenlistments might be another measure of unit morale if
other, confounding variables could be eliminated. A measure
of effectiveness for unit performance can be very illusive
since most measures are subject to human judgment and suffer
measurement error as a result; and, there is little evidence
that peacetime measures are related to wartime performance.
The importance of military history in the development of
officers seems obvious enough to be addressed in future
research using a larger sample size than that used in the
present effort.
The question of the effects of different perceptions of
leadership style as they relate to the outcome measures was
only briefly addressed in this thesis. Initial results suggest
that this area is worthy of further attention.
The results of this thesis indicate that the
recommendations made here should be of interest not only to
academic researchers, but also to the Marine Corps. Besides
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theoretical implications, the results have direct implications
for the development of leadership training programs.
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APPENDIX
This section presents information concerning the different
perceptions of each group of observers. These two tables
emphasize the difference in perception between the observers
in this sample and show the intercorrelations between the
leadership outcomes derived from each of the questionnaires.
The first table presents the relationship between all
leadership outcomes and the subordinate and superior
leadership outcomes, while the second table presents the
relationship between all leadership outcomes and the self and
peer leadership outcomes.
Three things stand out from the intercorrelations shown in
Tables 9 and 10:
1) The intercorrelations between leadership outcomes
derived from the same survey were highly correlated with each
other, as expected.
2) The intercorrelations between leadership outcomes
derived from different surveys were generally not
significantly correlated with each other, suggesting
perceptions vary widely between the groups of observers.
3) Exceptions were: subordinates' views of their own extra
effort were significantly and positively related to all three
leadership outcomes derived from the peer survey and also with
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the superior's view of subordinate extra effort. Subordinates
'
views of leader effectiveness were positively correlated with
the superior's view of leader effectiveness. The focal
officer's own perception of his effectiveness as a leader was
related to the superior's perception of subordinate extra
effort. The peers' views of subordinate extra effort were
negatively related to the superior's view of leader
effectiveness
.
There were no correlations between the perceptions of the
focal officers and the peers' perceptions indicating the
possibility that these two groups of officers saw Leadership
outcomes very differently. It is interesting the peers' and
superiors' sense of subordinate extra effort was related to
the subordinates' own view of their extra effort while the
focal officers' perception had no relationship.
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TABLE A-l. INTERCORRELATIONS BETWEEN ALL LEADERSHIP OUTCOMES
AND SUBORDINATE/SUPERIOR OUTCOMES
OUTCOMES
OUTCOMES SBEE SBEF SBSAT SPEE SPEF SPSAT MEAN
SBEE 1.00*" .35*" .36*" .30" .17 .18 3.20
(.55)
SBEF .35"* 1.00"* .65*"
.15 .28" .24* 3.03
(.47)
SBSAT .36*" .65'" 1.00"'
.17 .23* .16 3.14
(.69)
SPEE .30" .15 .17 1.00'" .62*" .56" - 3.15
(.57)
SPEF .17 .28" .23* .62*" 1.00"* .84" ' 3.02
(.66)
SPSAT .18 .24* .16 .56*" .84*" 1.00* " 3.26
(.74)
SFEE .19 .16 .08 .11 -.12 -.11 3.313
(.62)
SFEF -.12 .10 .05 .31** .20 .11 3.05
(.57)
SFSAT -.02 .14 22 .07 .16 .12 3.24
(.53)
PREE .26* -.02 .21 -.10 -.28* -.09 1.55
(.98)
PREF .36" .18 .06 -.06 -.11 .09 2.99
(.61)
PRSAT .36" .21 .18 -.13 -.16 .02 2.903
(.90)
Note: * significance level of .1
" significance level of .05
* significance level of .01
n = 56
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SFEE SFEF SFSAT PREE PREF PRSAT MEAN
SBEE .19 -.02 -.02 .26* .36*" .36*" 3.20
(.55)
SBEF .16 .10 .14 -.02 .18 .21 3.03
(.47)
SBSAT .08 .05 .22 .21 .06 .18 3.14
(.69)
SPEE .11 .31" .07 -.10 -.06 -.13 3.15
(.57)
SPEF -.12 .20 .13 -.28* -.11 -.16 3.02
(.66)
SPSAT -.11 .11 122 -.09 .09 .02 3.26
(.74)
SFEE 1.00*" .53*" .46"* .07 .01 .08 3.13
(.62)
SFEF .53-** 1.00"* .58*" -.12 -.02 -.03 3.05
(.57)
SFSAT .46*** .58*" 1.00" .11 .10 .05 3.24
(.53)
PREE .07 -.12 .11 1.00*** .51*" .56*" 1.55
(.98)
PREF .01 -.02 .10 .51"* 1.00*" .85"* 2.99
(.61)
PRSAT .08 -.03 .05 .56*" .85"* 1.00"* 2.93
(.90)
.Note: sigr lticance level (>i .1 n = 4^
" significance level of .05
*** significance level of .01
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